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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff appeals from the Fifth Judicial District Court's 
entry of judgment in favor of defendant Neal C. Capel, M.D. 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3) Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does a patient's voluntary acquiescence to and 
acceptance of requested medical care constitute consent to 
treatment? 
2. Is a wife's expressed, written consent for her spouse 
valid? 
3. Were the plaintiff's constitutional rights violated by 
the defendant's reliance upon the plaintiff's acquiescence and 
acceptance of treatment and upon the written consent of the 
plaintiff's spouse? 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not effect the 
substantial rights of the party. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1953, as amended) (set forth 
as Addendum A). 
3. Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-3 (1953, as amended) (set forth 
as Addendum B). 
4. Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-5(1) (1953, as amended) (set 
forth as Addendum C). 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(4) (1953, as amended) (set 
forth as Addendum D). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is a medical malpractice action in which the 
plaintiff alleges Dr. Capel performed surgery on him without his 
consent. It is undisputed that the surgery Dr. Capel performed 
was medically indicated and was skillfully done. It is further 
undisputed that plaintiff was fully informed of the nature of the 
prospective surgery. It is also undisputed that plaintiff's wife 
signed a consent form authorizing the very surgery performed. 
Finally, there is no dispute that plaintiff was wholly unable to 
produce medical expert testimony establishing the surgery caused 
harm to plaintiff. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below. 
This action came on regularly for jury trial on January 29, 
1990 before the Honorable Philip Eves, Fifth Judicial District 
Court. Both plaintiff and defendant appeared personally and by 
and through counsel. The parties selected a jury and presented 
opening statements. After the parties1 opening statements, the 
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parties stipulated to proffer the evidence upon which the court 
could determine whether a sufficient factual and legal basis had 
been shown to submit the case to the jury. At the conclusion of 
the proffer, defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence presented in light of the applic-
able statutory requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act, 
§ 78-14-1 et seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
The trial court concluded plaintiff failed to establish the 
requisite elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice. 
Specifically, the facts indicated implied consent on the part of 
the patient authorized the surgery. Further, while written 
consent is not required, the hospital consent form signed by the 
plaintiff's wife specifically authorized the surgery performed by 
Dr. Capel. The court found Dr. Capel was authorized as a matter 
of law to rely on said implied and express consent in performing 
the surgery. Further, the court found that without expert test-
imony establishing physical damages were proximately caused by 
Dr. Capel's conduct, both a claim for lack of informed consent 
and a claim for medical malpractice failed as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss with 
prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
attached hereto as Addendum E). 
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C. Statement of Facts, 
The plaintiff, Michel Lounsbury, was injured on the job on 
October 10, 1986. He reported walking across planking carrying a 
700 pound laminated beam when the planking gave way, leaving 
plaintiff supporting the weight of the beam by himself. (Dixie 
Medical Center records [hereafter M.R.] p. 6; Tr. 47.) He was 
seen initially by Dr. Noel Robinson of Beaver. X-rays were taken 
revealing a fractured vertebrae and herniated disc. fid.) 
Plaintiff later had a lumbar CT Scan on October 23rd and a 
myelogram on November 20th both of which confirmed the presence 
of a herniated disc at L5-S1 and a limbus fragment at the 
superior anterior margin on L4. (Tr. 48.) 
Mr. Lounsbury remained totally disabled from his injuries 
despite conservative treatment; consequently, he sought care from 
two orthopedic surgeons, Dr. David Moore and Dr. Glen Momberger. 
(Tr. 62.) Both physicians concluded that surgery was necessary 
if Mr. Lounsbury wanted to improve. After receiving these 
reports, the Industrial Commission advised the plaintiff that he 
would either have to have surgery or would receive future 
benefits only for the degree of disability he would be expected 
to have following corrective surgery. When he learned that 
Dr. Momberger would not be available to perform the surgery, 
Mr. Lounsbury chose to go to Dr. Capel. (Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 to 
Michel Lounsbury's deposition.) 
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The plaintiff and his wife met Dr. Capel in April of 1987. 
The proposed surgery was discussed in detail and Dr. Capel 
reviewed the potential complications. Dr. Capel charted: 
Patient has been given an explanation of the problem 
and its proposed treatment, has agreed with the course. 
Complications have been discussed and every efforts 
[sic] made to reduce the chance of these developing. 
(M.R., p. 9.) Thus, prior to surgery, Dr. Capel obtained the 
patient's verbal consent to the proposed surgery. (Tr. 64.) 
As is Dr. Capel's practice, a "fresh" or repeat myelogram 
and contrast CT scan were ordered in advance of the scheduled 
surgery. (Tr. 60.) Accordingly, the patient was admitted to the 
hospital the day before surgery. At this time, he signed an 
admission form acknowledging he was being admitted for back 
surgery. (M.R., p. 3.) 
From the time of his admission to the hospital until the 
time he was discharged, Mr. Lounsbury voluntarily submitted, 
acquiesced and even assisted with each and every preoperative 
step undertaken by the hospital staff. Specifically, at 12:15 on 
May 14, 1987, he was admitted and oriented to his room. At 1300 
he asked for and received medication for complaints of back pain. 
After receiving this and subsequent pain medication, the nurse 
charted that the plaintiff remained "awake and alert." (M.R., p. 
52.) 
At 1530 he was taken to radiology. The repeat myelogram 
confirmed the large central herniation of L5-S1 disc which had 
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worsened since the prior examination. (M.R., p. 27; Tr. 60.) 
Dr. Capel testified it is his unvarying practice to discuss the 
results of such preoperative exams with his patients and he 
believes he did so with the plaintiff. (Depo. Dr. Capel, pp. 28-
30.) 
After returning to his room at 1700, plaintiff complained of 
pain again and at 1710 another pain shot was given. At 2030 he 
was "awake and alert" with "no complaints of back discomfort." 
He was given coffee as he requested. 
At 2200 preparations began for the surgery. A Fleets enema 
was given to which the patient expressed no objection. 
Mr. Lounsbury took a hibiclens shower using a specially treated 
soap to kill bacteria on his skin. At 2300, 11:00 p.m., the 
preoperative teaching was done and the patient was instructed 
that he could eat or drink nothing after midnight. The nurse 
charted that the plaintiff "voices his understanding" that he 
will be allowed nothing by mouth beginning at midnight and, 
accordingly, at one minute after midnight, the patient's water 
was removed from his room. (M.R., pp. 51-52.) 
Mr. Lounsbury slept until 5:40 a.m. when he was awakened for 
surgery. At this point he hadn't received any pain medication 
for over six hours. The charting by the nurse on duty, Charlotte 
Chatterton, reflected that the patient fully cooperated with a 
lengthy and thorough surgical prep. (M.R., p. 53.) Had he 
voiced any objection or reluctance, the nurses would have 
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abruptly discontinued the preoperative procedure. (Tr. pp. 
62-64.) 
Here, with plaintiff's assistance, Nurse Chatterton shaved 
his back, sent him in for another shower instructing him to scrub 
his back carefully, and on his return she gave him a sterile 
scrub lasting 15 minutes and requiring has assistance. She then 
wrapped his back with sterile surgical wrap and put TED hose on 
his legs from his toes to his groin. At 6:10 the nurse charted 
that the patient was "relaxed" and that he has been NPO since 
24:00. The nurse also charted that he was up to the bathroom to 
void. Not until 6:25 a.m. were the preoperative medications 
given. (M.R., p. 53.) 
Because it was hospital policy at Dixie Medical Center to 
not allow any patient who had received pain medications to sign 
for surgery, the patient was instructed to call his wife early on 
the morning of surgery. (Tr. pp. 64-65.) He willingly complied. 
Mrs. Lounsbury was told by her husband to come in as he was being 
taken in for surgery. She hurried to the hospital, signed the 
consent form, and at 7:20, a full body sock was put on the 
patient. The nurses double-checked the preoperative check list 
and made sure it was complete, then wheeled the patient to the 
operating room on his bed. (Tr. 65; M.R. p. 53.) 
Dr. Capel had nothing to do with obtaining the signature of 
either the patient or his spouse prior to surgery. This was a 
function performed by the Dixie Medical Center nursing personnel 
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out of Dr. Capel's presence and without his knowledge or 
involvement. (Tr. 76.) 
As far as Dr. Capel was concerned, the plaintiff arrived in 
the surgical suite at 7:20 a.m. on the morning of May 15, 1987 
for a scheduled surgery. From Dr. Capel1s point of view, the 
plaintiff voluntarily went to the hospital; voluntarily complied 
with all of the preoperative steps; and verbally agreed to the 
surgery. Furthermore, a consent form had been signed by his wife 
in accordance with hospital policy and the preoperative myelogram 
confirmed the need for surgery. Thus, everything was completely 
in order and routine. (Tr. 97.) It is also important to note 
that it is uncontested that the surgery went well, that it was 
well-advised, and skillfully performed. (Tr. 54 and discussion 
pp. 81-89.) 
After the surgery Mr. Lounsbury expressed no objections, 
concerns or problems about having received the operation. The 
nurses' notes indicate that Mr. Lounsbury was returned from 
surgery at 11:30 on the morning of May 15, 1987. By 1616 he 
reported that he was feeling better. At 2245, he was awake, 
alert and oriented, requesting coffee. He voiced no complaints 
or requests. By the next afternoon, the nurse noted that the 
patient was Min good spirits"; he was "voicing no complaints." 
(M.R., p. 56.) By 4:00 in the afternoon on the day after 
surgery, the nurse on duty charted: "Patient is very cheerful, 
optimistic and cooperative." (M.R., p. 57.) Incredibly, 
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assuming throughout this entire period of time, plaintiff was 
convinced unauthorized surgery had been performed, not once did 
he complain regarding the surgery -- up to and including his 
discharge from the hospital on May 21, 1987 at 1:30 p.m., a 
complete week after his admission. He also never voiced any 
protest or complaint to Dr. Capel during any of his postoperative 
visits with the defendant. He filed his Notice of Intent to 
Commence a Malpractice Action a year and a half after the 
surgery; this was the first time Dr. Capel learned Michel was 
dissatisfied. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the record that the patient 
suffered any harm arising out of the health care rendered. No 
expert would testify that the surgery was the proximate cause of 
the patient's persistent pain. (Transcript, pp. 61-62, 77-79.) 
In a frank discussion before the court, plaintiff's attorney 
admitted that he could not prove the plaintiff was damaged by the 
operation. (Transcript, pp. 96-7 and 104.) In other words, 
there was no factual foundation establishing a causal connection 
between the operation and the plaintiff's suffering. The 
evidence from Dr. Capel and Dr. Reed Fogg, plaintiff's subsequent 
treating physician, indicated the surgery was "successful"; the 
largest component of any residual problems was psychological. 
(Tr. 67, 81 and 88-89. ) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that Dr. Capel per-
formed surgery on March 15, 1987 without his consent. Plaintiff 
does not claim the surgery was unnecessary; nor that there was 
anything improper with regard to the operative technique; nor 
that Dr. Capel failed to properly inform him regarding the 
prospective surgery. 
Since the inception of this lawsuit, plaintiff has attempted 
to fashion the facts of this case into some theory of recovery. 
He has failed and should fail on this appeal because there was 
absolutely no tortious conduct on the part of the defendant. 
The plaintiff alleges he did not consent to the procedure, 
but his conduct as a matter of law demonstrates that he did. The 
Utah legislature anticipated this type of occurrence and mandated 
that when a person submits to health care rendered by a health 
care provider, it is presumed that what the health care provider 
did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. As 
a matter of public policy, a patient cannot keep his fingers 
crossed behind his back and thereby place in jeopardy those who 
rely on what he says and does. 
In addition to the plaintiff's obvious implied consent to 
treatment, express consent was obtained. Again, by statute, in 
Utah a spouse is authorized to sign on behalf of a patient. It 
is important to note there is no requirement that written consent 
be obtained; nonetheless, in this case, a written consent was 
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properly obtained and was in full compliance with the provisions 
of the Utah Code which provides that such a written consent 
"shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health 
care provider . . ." Section 78-14-5(2)(e), Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended). 
Next, plaintiff attempts to state a claim for a lack of 
informed consent, but he has never denied that he was properly 
informed and he has been unable to establish damages were proxi-
mately caused by defendant's surgery. Thus, as a matter of law, 
plaintiff fails to establish the requisite elements of a claim 
for lack of informed consent as outlined in S 78-14-5(1) and 
subparts (a) through (g), inclusive, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
Next, plaintiff attempts to create a claim for common law 
battery. This claim is similarly barred because consent was 
given. Furthermore, common law battery has been subsumed by the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act insofar as it can be applied to 
health care providers. In addition, the Utah Supreme court, 
under similar facts, has already rejected such a technical 
battery claim. Baxter v. Snow, discussed infra at page 13. 
As a last resort, plaintiff now asserts that the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act is unconstitutional. However, plaintiff's 
arguments are misplaced. The plaintiff was not required to 
submit to surgery; he, on his own volition, went to the hospital 
and he accepted each of the procedures which led to the operating 
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room. He never once made known to Dr. Capel any reluctance 
regarding surgery. He was not deprived of any right. He could 
have exercised his constitutional rights by putting on his shoes 
and walking out the door. 
Finally, public policy dictates that physicians and 
hospitals must have the ability to obtain consent from someone 
other than a patient. Here, Dixie Medical Center did so only to 
insure that the patient would not come back later and say that he 
had been given pain medications and therefore his consent was 
improperly obtained. Hospitals all across America have similar 
guidelines requiring hospital staff to obtain signed consent from 
representatives of patients who have been given pain medications. 
Such a practice does not violate constitutional rights. 
Consequently, none of plaintiff's attempts to recover 
against defendant for surgery he requested and obtained have any 




THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO RELY UPON THE 
CONSENT EXPRESSED BY THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF 
AND OBTAINED FROM PLAINTIFF'S WIFE. 
A. Implied Consent. 
When a person submits to health care, "it shall be presumed 
that what the health care provider did was either expressly or 
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impliedly authorized to be done." Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-5(1) 
(1953, as amended). 
This statutory presumption had its inception in the early 
case of Baxter v. Snow, 2 P.2d 257 (Utah 1931). There, the 
patient claimed that the defendant doctor treated him without his 
consent. The court held that the patient's voluntary submission 
to an examination and to treatment by the doctor and his acqui-
escence in the doctor's acts impliedly authorized the doctor to 
diagnose the plaintiff's case and to use any reasonable treatment 
he deemed necessary. The voluntary submission by the plaintiff 
to the physician for care and treatment was deemed to have 
evidenced the patient's consent to the operation. Consequently, 
the court concluded it is erroneous to instruct the jury that 
surgery without consent is a technical battery. 
In the present case, as in Baxter, the conduct of the 
patient evidenced consent to the surgery. Similar results were 
reached in Charley v. Cameron, 528 P.2d 1205 (Kan. 1974), which 
involved an obstetrical patient with a stated fear of forceps. 
Because neither she nor her husband stated a clear objection to 
their use during the delivery, the court found as a matter of law 
that consent to surgical treatment had been granted by the 
conduct of the patient. Further, once such implied consent has 
been given, there can be no recovery for battery. 528 P.2d at 
1210-11. 
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In Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1967), the patient 
claimed pain medications given after admission to the hospital 
for planned surgery so clouded the patient's judgment that the 
written consent was invalid. The Washington Supreme Court was 
unpersuaded and held: 
The rule is well established that in surgical cases, 
consent to such procedure must be obtained from either 
the patient, or, if the patient is under some dis-
ability, from a near relative capable of giving 
consent. Such consent to surgery may be manifested in 
a number of ways: as an express consent the patient 
may sign a formal written permission or agree orally; 
or he may give implied authority by his conduct, as in 
voluntarily submitting to an operation or by failing to 
object. 
422 P.2d at 814, cites omitted. Thus, regardless of the question 
of express consent, the court determined implied consent autho-
rized the surgery as a matter of law. 
The court then concluded: 
We do not believe there is room for reasonable minds to 
differ that the plaintiff has failed to overcome by 
clear, cogent and convincing evidence the presumption 
that he comprehended the nature, terms and effect of 
the consent given for the surgical operation. 
Id. at 815. The court then affirmed the trial court's directed 
verdict in favor of the defendant. 
Here, as in Grannum, plaintiff has failed to produce the 
required "clear, cogent and convincing evidence11 necessary to 
rebut the statutory presumption that the health care rendered was 
authorized. Conversely, Dr. Capel, by statute and by Utah case 
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law directly on point, was absolutely entitled to rely on the 
implied consent of this patient. 
Consequently, since both the Utah statutory provision for 
medical consent and case law recognize that consent to a medical 
procedure can be impliedly given and because such implied consent 
was given in the present case, the plaintiff cannot prevail upon 
any of his proposed causes of action. 
B. Spousal Consent. 
Section 78-14-5(4)(b) of the Utah Code specifically 
authorizes any married person to consent to health care for a 
spouse. (Addendum D.) Therefore, Dr. Capel was absolutely 
entitled to rely on Mrs. Lounsburyfs express consent to her 
husband's surgery. (See "Admissions" set forth as Addendum F.) 
Further, while there is no requirement written consent be 
obtained, the written consent form Mrs. Lounsbury signed complied 
fully with the statutory requirements of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. The form, once signed, became a complete 
defense absent circumstances not present here: 
It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against 
a health care provider based upon alleged failure to 
obtain informed consent if: . . . (e) the patient or 
his representative executed a written consent which 
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended 
health care and which contains a declaration that the 
patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious 
harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial 
results of health care and which acknowledges that 
health care providers involved have explained his 
condition and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory manner and that all questions asked about the 
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health care and its attendant risks have been answered 
in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his 
representative . . . 
S 78-14-5(2)(e), Utah Code Ann, (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). 
Thus, along with impliedly authorizing the surgery by his 
conduct, the hospital staff properly obtained written express 
authorization. Dr. Capel was clearly entitled to rely on the 
patient's apparent and stated decision to proceed with scheduled 
surgery. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A CLAIM OF LACK OF 
INFORMED CONSENT. 
To establish "lack of informed consent," plaintiff must 
prove all of the statutory elements encoded in subsection (1) of 
§ 78-14-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). Burton v. 
Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985). Thus, in order for 
the plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant based on the 
defendant's alleged failure to obtain consent, the plaintiff was 
required to have established: 
(a) That a provider/patient relationship existed 
between the patient and health care provider; and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to 
the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out 
of the health care rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a sub-
stantial and significant risk of causing the patient 
serious harm; and 
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(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial 
and significant risk; and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's 
position would not have consented to the health care 
rendered after having been fully informed as to all 
facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In 
determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the 
patient's position would do under the circumstances, 
the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the 
patient before health care was provided and before the 
occurrence of any personal injuries alleged to have 
arisen from said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered 
was the proximate cause of personal injury suffered by 
the patient. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1953, as amended). 
In the present case, the plaintiff did not proffer any 
evidence proving that the operation performed by the defendant 
proximately caused any injury or damage to his person. In fact, 
the plaintiff's attorney was unable to find even one medical 
expert willing to testify that the operation more probably than 
not caused or increased the plaintiff's current physical 
problems. 
In addition, the court found, based on the proffer of evi-
dence, that plaintiff was fully informed regarding the surgery. 
Further, the court was not persuaded a reasonable person would 
have objected under the same circumstances—that is, months of 
pain and disability; unsuccessful attempts at conservative 
management; several concurring opinions regarding the need for 
surgery; the threat of losing disability benefits unless surgery 
was performed. 
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Consequently, the trial court properly ruled plaintiff had 
not presented sufficient facts to support a claim for lack of 
informed consent. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PREVAIL ON A CLAIM FOR 
BATTERY. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act specifically subsumes 
all torts which could conceivably arise within the context of a 
patient/physician relationship. Section 78-14-3 defines the 
following terms: "Health care" is defined as "any act or treat-
ment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed 
or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf 
of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or 
confinement." 
"Malpractice action against a health care provider" is 
defined as "any action against a health care provider, whether in 
contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, 
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out 
of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." 
Finally, "tort" is defined as "any legal wrong, breach of 
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately 
causing injury or damage to another." 
Based on these statutory definitions, the plaintiff cannot 
avoid application of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to the 
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facts of this case by attempting to frame his complaint as a 
claim for battery. In other words, "labeling the act an inten-
tional tort does not change the action from what it is, a species 
of medical malpractice." Sistrunk v. Hoshall, 530 So.2d 935 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
Generally, operating on a patient without the patient's 
consent is considered a form of medical malpractice, and not 
battery. Vargas v. Rosal-Arcillas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1981). For 
example, in Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. App. 
1980), the court held that: 
An action prefaced on the doctrine of informed consent 
is now considered as one based on negligence, not 
BATTERY, an intentional tort. See Natanson v. Kline, 
1960 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan. 
186, 354 P.2d 670; Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) 165, 
166. Thus, as in any negligence case a plaintiff must 
show a duty owed to him and a breach of that duty (by 
falling below the set standard of care) which proxi-
mately causes a compensable injury. (Emphasis in 
original.) 
Likewise, in Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (N.Y.A.D. 
1980), the Court noted that the conduct of the parties should be 
measured by a negligence as opposed to an assault and battery 
analysis in malpractice actions. The Dries court concluded: 
We believe that medical treatment beyond the scope of a 
patient's consent should not be considered as an inten-
tional tort or species of assault and battery as it has 
been viewed in the past. Other authorities note that 
"negligence standards which deal with the possession 
and use of skill and due care better accord with the 
realities of the physician-patient relationship.11 (1 
Louisell and Williams, Medical Malpractice § 8.09.) 
Dries, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 564. 
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For these reasons, the case of Eis v. Chestnut, 627 P.2d 124 
(N.M. 1981), upon which the plaintiff heavily relies, is easily 
distinguishable. Furthermore, even New Mexico closely circum-
scribes the application of battery in the context of a medical 
malpractice action: 
To defeat a battery claim, however, the information 
which must be disclosed is quite narrow in scope. A 
physician only has to inform the patient of the nature 
of the procedure; that is, what the doctor proposes to 
do to him. 
Geretv v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180, 191 (N.M. 1978) (emphasis in 
original). The Geretv court added: "It is now generally held 
that an action involving lack of informed consent does not lie 
within the traditional concepts of battery." 589 P.2d at 192. 
Thus, the only question relevant in a battery case, as 
recognized in New Mexico, is whether the patient was advised of 
and impliedly authorized the medical treatment which was going to 
be performed. In the present case it is undisputed that the 
plaintiff was informed of the nature of the procedure prior to 
the operation; therefore, even under New Mexico's law the 
plaintiff could not recover on a theory of battery. 
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POINT IV 
NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT HAS BEEN VIOLATED. 
A. This Case is Distinguishable From Cases Involvina 
Constitutional Rights. 
Under the facts of this case, constitutional claims are not 
properly invoked. Here, Dr. Capel was acting in compliance with 
statutory law and case law; he was fully entitled to rely on such 
legal authority. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's constitutional rights were not 
violated by the defendant's reliance on the patient's implied 
consent and on the wife's written consent. There is no justi-
fication or need for defendant to address the constitutionality 
of legislation from a hypothetical viewpoint. 
The factor which distinguishes the cases cited by plaintiff 
from the present case is the voluntary nature of the conduct 
involved. The factual setting of this case is repeated daily in 
thousands of hospitals across the country. Patients who submit 
to care voluntarily are not being deprived of constitutional 
rights. 
In contrast, the refusal to allow hospital personnel and 
medical doctors to rely upon written consent of others in this 
type of factual setting will have one of two consequences: (1) 
providers will be unfairly placed at risk if they proceed with 
care that may be life saving; or (2) they would let patients go 
without care, a potentially fatal consequence. 
-21-
This Court need not venture into a discussion of constitu-
tional issues because no such issues are involved. The factual 
setting presented here of a patient who consents by deed, if not 
by word, and of a spouse who consents after her husband has 
voluntarily received medication which impairs his legal capacity 
involves no constitutional violations. 
Finally, the legislature acted properly and appropriately in 
addressing the issue of consent. It is not the function of this 
Court to evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of 
legislative enactments. Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake City Com'n, 624 
P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981). 
B. Plaintiff Was Not Deprived of His Rights to Privacy. 
Plaintiff, in order to establish his constitutional right to 
privacy was violated, must rebut the presumption that health care 
rendered by a health care provider was either expressly or 
impliedly authorized. Further, he must prove that he refused to 
consent to the surgery performed by Dr. Capel. Plaintiff must so 
prove by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence.ff Grannum, 422 
P.2d at 815. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the plaintiff advised 
defendant he objected to the medical care rendered. Despite the 
fact he had ample opportunity to convey his reluctance and with-
draw his consent to surgery, there is simply nothing in the 
record to indicate he did so. 
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Thus, the plaintiff exercised his constitutional right to 
privacy by asking Dr. Capel to perform the surgery, by coming to 
the hospital as scheduled, by assisting with the preoperative 
steps. He could have as easily exercised his constitutional 
rights by standing up and walking out of the hospital. No one 
would have tried to stop him. No one wanted him to have surgery 
he did not choose to have. 
Finally, to require more of Dr. Capel under the circum-
stances of this case would be unfair and unworkable. He should 
not be expected to read minds. Public policy dictates surgeons 
should be entitled to rely on conduct evidencing consent and on 
hospital policies which require spouses to sign for patients who 
have received pain medication. Further, public policy would 
endorse the legislature's prerogative to identify those people 
who have capacity to sign for and give consent on behalf of 
another individual. Doctors should not be required to proceed at 
their own risk; rather, they should be entitled to rely on 
methods for a patient to be informed and to evidence consent 
which are legally enforceable in a court of law. 
C. Utah's Informed Consent Provision Is Constitutional. 
Utah courts have strongly and consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of the provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 
P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 1981). See, also, Yates v. Vernal Family 
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Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); McGulre v. University of 
Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); and Vealev v. 
Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
Furthermore, Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act, in parti-
cular the informed consent provision of that Act, is not unique. 
Many states have similar statutory provisions. E.g.. Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 766.103 (1990 Supp.); Ga. Code Ann. S 31-9-2 (1985); Idaho 
Code § 39-4303 (1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. S 90-21.13 (1985 & 1989 
Supp.)* Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, courts 
have addressed the constitutionality of informed consent statutes 
similar to Utah's and have found them to be constitutional. 
E.g., Parikh v. Cunningham, 493 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1986); Dixon v. 
Peters, 306 S.E.2d 477 (N.C.App. 1983). No case could be found 
holding an informed consent provision unconstitutional. 
D. The Open Courts Provision Has Not Been Violated. 
As stated above, plaintiff could not prevail on a battery 
claim even if he could raise it. Nonetheless, the plaintiff 
suggests that section 78-14-5 of the Medical Malpractice Act is 
unconstitutional because it denies him a remedy for common law 
battery in a malpractice claim. However, courts have held the 
legislature may abolish a common law cause of action regardless 
of the "open courts" provision. Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence, 
740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984). 
-24-
The legislature has the power to abrogate old laws and 
create new ones. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985), this court stated: 
. . . neither the due process nor the open courts 
provision constitutionalizes the common law or other-
wise freezes the law governing private rights and 
remedies as of the time of statehood. It is, in fact, 
one of the important functions of the Legislature to 
change and modify the law that governs relations 
between individuals as society evolves and conditions 
require. 
Id. at 676. Berry does, however, recognize some limits to the 
legislature's ability to change or modify the law. Id. 
Specifically, Berry imposed a two-part test for determining 
whether or not a legislative enactment violates the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution. Under the Berry test, Art. 
I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is satisfied if: 
(1) the law provides the injured person an effective remedy 
"by due course of law;" or 
(2) if there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if: 
(a) a social or economic evil is eliminated; and 
(b) the elimination of an existing remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective. Id. 
at 680. 
To begin with, section 78-14-5 provides the plaintiff with a 
reasonable alternative to the common law tort of battery. The 
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plaintiff contends that since the elements of the statutory-
alternative differ from those of the common law tort, the substi-
tute remedy is not substantially equal to the one at common law. 
Under such a rule, no law could ever be modified; any new statu-
tory provision could only be a re-enactment of the common law. 
Obviously, as society changes, and as advancements in 
technology are made, the law must change. Furthermore, the 
modifications or changes in the law need to address current 
societal problems. This is just what the legislature did when it 
enacted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The legislators 
addressed a current societal problem: the medical malpractice 
insurance crisis. See, Section 78-14-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
Consequently, because the express declaration of the Actfs 
purpose set forth in Section 78-14-2 satisfies the second prong 
of the Berry test, the Act does not violate the open courts 
provision of the State Constitution. Moreover, since the statute 
is a substitute for the common law tort of battery, the first 
prong of the Berry test is also met. Thus, the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act satisfies the open courts provision of the State 
Constitution. 
E. Substantive Due Process Claims Do Not Apply. 
The Due Process Clause prohibits the taking of "property" 
without due process of law. The plaintiff contends that his due 
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process rights were violated because the common law cause of 
action for battery in context of a malpractice claim was abro-
gated when it was subsumed into the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
However, what the plaintiff fails to realize is that he does 
not have a property interest in a cause of action until it 
becomes "vested" by virtue of an injury having been done. See 
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933); Masich v. United States 
Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 624 (Utah 1948); 
Hunter v. School District, 293 N.W.2d 515 (Wis. 1980). In Munn 
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1977), the Supreme Court indicated: 
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any 
rule of the common law. That is only one of the forms 
of municipal law, and is not more sacred than any 
other. Rights of property which have been created by 
the common law cannot be taken away without due pro-
cess; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be 
changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legis-
lature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. 
Indeed the great office of statutes is to remedy 
defects in the common law as they are developed and to 
adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances. 
94 U.S. at 134. 
In addition, even if the plaintiff had a vested or property 
interest in the abrogated battery claim, his due process rights 
were not violated since the legislature provided a substitute 
cause of action, or quid pro quo, in return. See, Masich, 191 
P.2d at 624; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 
903, 910 (Ohio 1976). Furthermore, it does not matter that this 
quid pro quo does not benefit the plaintiff individually, as long 
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as society as a whole benefits therefrom. Masich, 191 P.2d at 
624 (Utah 1948). 
CONCLUSION 
There is no cause of action which supports plaintiff's 
claims for relief and there should not be. To allow a plaintiff 
to recover under the facts of this case would make it impossible 
to render medical care to patients. It would require surgeons to 
be mind-readers and allow patients to accept medical treatment 
but keep their fingers crossed behind their backs regarding their 
"true" intentions. It would allow patients to recover whenever 
the desired benefits of care were not achieved even though the 
care was skillfully and appropriately rendered. No rights have 
been violated. No tortious act has been committed. The only 
injustice would be if self-serving claims unsupported by any 
evidence, such as the claims presented by Mr. Lounsbury, were 
somehow ratified by the legal system. Dr. Capel did as he was 
asked and did it well. 
DATED this /7 day of September, 1990. 
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78-14-1. Short title of act 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Health Care Malpractice Act." it7S 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations— 
Purpose of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number 
of suits and claims for damages and the amount of 
judgments and settlements arising from health care 
has increased greatly in recent years. Because of 
these increases the insurance industry has substan-
tially increased the cost of medical malpractice insur-
ance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims is increased care cost, both through 
the health care providers passing the cost of pre-
miums to the patient and through the provider's prac-
ticing defensive medicine because he views a patient 
as a potential adversary in a lawsuit Further, cer-
tain health care providers are discouraged from con-
tinuing to provide services because of the high cost 
and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the inten-
tion of alleviating the adverse effects which these 
trends are producing in the public's health care sys-
tem, it is necessary to protect the public interest by 
enacting measures designed to encourage private in-
surance companies to continue to provide health-re-
lated, malpractice insurance while at the same time 
establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability 
of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable 
from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legisla-
ture to provide a reasonable time in which actions 
may be commenced against health care providers 
while limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be rea-
sonably and accurately calculated; and to provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early eveJm^ 
and settlement of daims. u*uo* 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Audiologisi" means a person licensed u 
practice audiology under Chapter 41, Title &a 
(2) ^Certified social worker" means a per** 
licensed to practice as a certified social worker at 
provided in Section 58-35-5. 
(3) Chiropractic physician* means a person U. 
censed to practice chiropractic under Section 
58-12-50 through 58-12-56, the Chiropractic 1*. 
ptofeiucnts Act. 
(4) "Commissioner* means the ^"mnissioner 
of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-10Z 
(5) "Dental hygienist* means a person licensed 
to practice dental hygiene as defined in Section 
58-7-1.1. 
(6) "Dentist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice dentistry as defined in Section 58-7-1.1. 
(7) "Future damages" includes damages for fin 
ture medical treatment, care or custody, loss of 
future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
(8) "Health care" means any act or treatment 
performed or furnished, or which should hav« 
been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during 
the patient's medical care, treatment or confine-
ment. 
(9) "Health care provider" includes any per-
son, partnership, association, corporation, or 
other facility or institution who causes to be ren-
dered or who renders health care or professional 
services as a hospital, physician, registered 
nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, 
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical 
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical 
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic 
physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic 
physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, 
audiologist, speech-language pathologist, certi-
fied social worker, social service worker, soctal 
service aide, marriage and family counselor, 
practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering 
similar care and services relating to or arising 
out of the health needs of persons or groups of 
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any 
of the above acting in the course and scope of 
their employment. 
(10) "Hospital* means a public or private insti-
tution licensed under the Hospital Licensing Act 
(11) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person 
licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse 
as provided in Section 58-31-10. 
(12) "Malpractice action against a health care 
provider" means any action against a health care 
provider, whether in contract, tort, breach oj 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based 
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or aris-
ing out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(13) "Marriage and family therapist" means • 
person licensed to practice as a marriage then-
piat or family therapist as provided in Section 
58-39-6. 
(14) "Naturopathic physician* means a person 
licensed to practice naturopathy as defined »n 
Section 58-12-22. 
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(15) "Nurse-midwuV means a person licensed 
to practice nurse-midwifery as provided in Sec-
uon 58-44-7. 
(16) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to 
practice optometry as defined in Section 
58-16-H. 
(17) "Osteopathic physician" means a person 
licensed to practice osteopathy under Sections 
5$. 12-1 through 58-12-7, the Utah Osteopathic 
Medicine Licensing Act 
(18) "Patient" means a person who is under 
the care o£ a health care provider, under a con-
tract, express or implied. 
(19) Tharxnacist" means a person licensed to 
practice pharmacy as provided in Section 
58-17-2. 
(20) "Physical therapist" means a person li-
censed to practice physical therapy as provided in 
Section 58-24-6. 
(21) "Physician" means a person licensed to 
practice medicine and surgery under Sections 
58-12-26 through 58-12-43, the Utah Medical 
Practice Act. 
(22) Todiamst" means a person licensed to 
practice podiatry under Chapter 5, Title 58. 
(23) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a per-
son licensed to practice as a physician in this 
state unaer Sections 58-12-26 through 58-12-43, 
the Utah Medical Practice Act. 
(24) '"Psychologist" means a person licensed to 
practice psychology as denned in Subsection 
58-25a-2(3). 
(25) "Registered nurse" means a person li-
censed to practice professional nursing as pro-
vided in Section 58-31-9. 
(26) "Representative" means the spouse, par-
ent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other 
legal agent of the patient. 
(27) "Social service aide" means a person li-
censed to practice as a social service aide as pro-
vided in Section 58-35-5. 
(28) "Social service worker" means a person 
licensed to practice as a soaal service worker as 
provided in Secnon 58-35-5. 
(29) "Speech-language pathologist" means a 
person licensed to practice speech-language pa-
thology under Chapter 41, Title 58. 
(30) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of 
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission 
proximately causing injury or damage to an-
other, its* 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — 
Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first oc-
curs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except 
that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against 
the health care provider is that a foreign object 
has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the for-
eign object wrongfully left in the patients body, 
whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a pa-
tient has been prevented from discovering mis-
conduct on the part of a health care provider be-
cause that health care-provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged miscon-
duct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disabil-
ity under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, 
partnerships, associations and corporations and to ail 
health care providers and to all malpractice actions 
against health care providers based upon alleged per-
sonal usuries which occurred prior to the effective 
date of this act; provided, however, that any action 
which under former law could have been commenced 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within the one lapsed portion of time allowed 
under former law; but any action which under former 
law could have been commenced more than four years 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within four years after the effective date of this 
act. it7* 
78-14-4^. Amount of award reduced by 
amounts of collateral sources avail-
able to plaintiff — No reduction where 
subrogation nght exists — Collateral 
sources defined — Procedure to pre-
serve subrogation rights — Evidence 
admissible — Exceptions. 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care 
providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3(29) in 
which damages are awarded to compensate the plain-
tiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the 
amount of such award by the total of all amounts paid 
to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are 
available to him; however, there shall be no reduction 
for collateral sources for which a subrogation nght 
exists as provided in this section nor shall there be a 
reduction for any collateral payment not included m 
the award of damages. Upon a finding of liability and 
an awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court 
shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts 
of collateral sources which have been paid to or for 
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available 
to nun. The court shall also take testimony of any 
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited 
by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his 
immediate family to secure his nght to any collateral 
source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his 
injury, and shall offset any reduction m the award by 
such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no 
reducuon made with respect to future collateral 
source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4). 
(2) For purposes of this section "collaterai source" 
means payments made to or for the benefit of the 
plaintiff for: 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments 
payable under the United States Soaal Secunty 
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability 
act, or any other public program, except the fed-
eral programs which are required by law to seek 
subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability 
insurance, automobile accident insurance that 
provides health benefits or income disability cov-
erage, and any other similar insurance benefits. 
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except life insurance benefits available to the 
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or 
provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, 
group, organization, partnership, or corporation 
to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hos-
pital, medical, dental, or other health care ser-
vices, except benefits received as gifts, contribu-
tions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continu-
ation plan provided by employers or any other 
system intended to provide wages during a period 
of disability 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts 
paid or received pnor to settlement or judgment, a 
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 
days before settlement or trial of the action a written 
notice upon each health care provider against whom 
the malpractice action has been asserted. The written 
notice shall state the name and address of the pro-
vider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral 
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons 
who received payment, and the items and purposes 
for which payment has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs 
that provide payments or benefits available m the 
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the ex-
tent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to 
pay Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that 
such programs, payments, or benefits will be avail-
able in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact 
may consider such evidence m determining the 
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future 
expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to 
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health 
care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or 
entity as reimbursement for collateral source pay-
ments made prior to settlement or judgment, includ-
ing any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to 
amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are 
preserved as provided in this section. All policies of 
insurance providing benefits affected by this section 
are construed in accordance with this section. itss 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — 
Proof required of patient — Defenses 
— Consent to health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered 
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that 
what the health care provider did was either ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a pa-
tient to recover damages from a health care provider 
in an action based upon the provider's failure to ob-
tain informed consent, the patient must prove the 
following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed 
between the patient and health care provider, 
and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health 
care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries aris-
ing out of the health care rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the 
patient serious harm: and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the sub-
stantial and significant nsk; and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person m the pa-
tient's position would not have consented to the 
health care rendered after having been fully in-
formed as to all facts relevant to the decision to 
give consent In determining what a reasonable 
prudent person m the patient's position would <fc 
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall 
ate the viewpoint of the patient before health 
care was provided and before the occurrence of 
any personal injuries alleged to have ansen from 
said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health car* 
rendered was the proximate cause of persona] m. 
juries suffered by the patient 
(2) It snail be a defense to any malpractice actum 
against a health care provider based upon alleged 
failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the a*, 
tient actually suffered was relatively minor, or 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from 
the health care provider was commonly known %Q 
the public; or 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the 
health care complained of, that he would accept 
the health care involved regardless of the risk: or 
that he did not want to be informed of the mat-
ters to which he would be entitled to be informed, 
or 
(d) the health care provider, after considennf 
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used 
reasonable discretion as to the manner and ex-
tent to which risks were disclosed, if the health 
care provider reasonably believed that additional 
disclosures could be expected to have a substan 
oal and adverse effect on the patient's condition 
or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a 
written consent which sets forth the nature and 
purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the patient accept! 
the nsk of substantial and serious harm, if any, 
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health 
care providers involved have explained his condi-
tion and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory manner and that all questions asaed about 
the health care and its attendant risks have been 
answered in a manner satisfactory to the pauent 
or his representative; such written consent shall 
be a defense to an action against a health are 
provider based upon failure to obtain informed 
consent unless the patient proves that the person 
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or 
shows by clear and convincing proof that the exe-
cution of the written consent was induced by u* 
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent nut-
representation or fraudulent omission to stst* 
material facts. . 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be eonstm** 
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or ^ 
from refusing to consent to health care for his •*• 
person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized a n d **j 
powered to consent to any health care not prohibit 
by law; 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or s to*** 
for his minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a sPouse:,^0p#. 
(c) any person temporarily standing »n ,oCO J£ 
rentis, whether formally serving or not «* ^ 
mmor under his care and any guardian *<> 
Wmrt;
 ver** 
(d) any person eighteen years of age or o 
his or her parent who is unable by reason o 
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh. Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHEL LOUNSBURY, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 89-2550 
NEAL C. CAPEL, M.D., Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendant. 
This action came on regularly for jury trial on January 29, 
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves presiding. The plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through his counsel, Floyd W. Holm, Esq. of Chamberlain & Higbeer 
and defendant appeared personally and by and through his counsel, 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. and. Elizabeth King Brennan, Esqv oil 
Snow, christensen & Martineau~ The parties- selected a jury and 
presented opening statements. 
After the parties' opening statements, the parties 
stipulated that plaintiff, could present a proffer of evidence 
which the Court could then rely upon to determine whether a 
ADDENDUM E 
sufficient factual and legal basis had been shown to submit the 
case to the jury. Plaintiff, through his counsel, presented a 
proffer on the record of evidence he anticipated his witnesses 
would offer should they be called to testify. At the conclusion 
of the proffer, defendant made a Motion to Dismiss based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence presented in light of the statutory 
requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act, S78-14-1, et 
seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
The Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff, Michel Lounsbury was injured in an 
industrial accident on October 10, 1986. 
2. Plaintiff was admitted to Dixie Medical Hospital for 
surgery on May 14, 1987. 
3. On the morning of surgery, a consent form authorizing 
surgery was signed by plaintiff's wife. 
4. The surgical consent form authorized surgery by Dr. 
Capel for Michel Lounsbury. 
5. The surgery authorized was the surgery performed by Dr. 
Capel. 
6. There is no evidence of fraudulent concealment or 
fraudulent omission to state material facts on the part of Dr. 
Capel. 
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action is a medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider which is governed by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, $78-14-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). 
2. Mrs. Lounsbury was authorized and empowered by the 
provisions of Section 78-14-5(4)(b) to consent to health care 
rendered to her husband. 
3. The consent form the plaintiff's spouse, Janet 
Lounsbury, signed on her husband's behalf complied with the 
provisions of Section 78-14-5(2)(e), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
4. Dr. Capel was authorized as a matter of law to rely on 
said consent in performing the surgery. 
5. When a person submits to health care rendered by a 
health care provider, it is presumed that what the health care 
provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be 
done. Section 78-14-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
6. The consent form executed by the plaintiff's spouse 
provides a complete defense to plaintiff's claim of alleged 
failure to obtain his consent to the surgery. 
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7. Plaintiff also failed as a matter of law to establish 
the other elements of a claim for lack of informed consent as 
outlined in Section 78-14-5(1), Subsections (a) through (g). To 
prevail on a claim for lack of informed consent, plaintiff must 
establish each and every element of said section. However, in 
this case plaintiff offered no evidence that he suffered personal 
injuries arising out of the health care rendered, as required by 
subsection (c); nor that a reasonable prudent person in the 
patient's position would not have consented to the health care 
rendered after having been fully informed as to all the facts 
relevant to the decision to give consent as required by 
subsection (f); nor that the unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by 
the plaintiff, as required by subsection (g). 
8. Further, by failing to produce evidence of physical 
damages which were proximately caused by Dr. Capel's conduct, 
plaintiff's claim for lack of informed consent fails as a matter 
of law. 
9. In a negligence action against a health care 
professional, plaintiff must establish, usually through expert 
testimony, that the defendant's conduct deviated from recognized 
and accepted standards and that said conduct was a proximate 
cause of the damages as alleged by the plaintiff. Based on 
plaintiff's proffer, the court finds as a matter of law that the 
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evidence does not establish negligence on the part of the 
defendant, nor that defendant's conduct proximately caused 
physical damages. 
10. The plaintiff in this medical malpractice action cannot 
recover for emotional or psychological damages because there is 
no evidence establishing proximate causation. Thus, defendant 
Dr. Capel can not be held accountable for unforeseeable 
psychological consequences of his surgery, whether it be 
successful or unsuccessful. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as well as on the stipulation and evidence proffered by the 
parties, the court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 
orders that plaintiff's Complaint be, and the same is hereby, 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ T. Philip Eyes 
J. Philip Eves 






























TTOHNIYS AT LAW 
M O SOUTH MAIN 
P. O. BOX 72S 
CCOAR C ITY . 
UTAH B4720 
FLOYD W HOLM U522] 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHEL LOUNSBURY, 
Plaintiff, 
v s . 
NEAL C. CAPEL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
ANSWERS TO REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 89-2550 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, MICHEL S. LOUNSBURY, being first duly sworn upon oath depose 
and say that I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled action, that I have read 
the following Answers to Request for Admissions and that the same are true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the document entitled "Consent to 
Operation, Anesthet ics , and Other Medical Services" (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Consent form") attached hereto as Exhibit "A" i s genuine and i s a 
true and accurate copy of the original. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 1: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit Janet Lounsbury signed the Consent form on 
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CEDAR CITY. 
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ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 2: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit Janet Lounsbury was the spouse of plaintiff 
Michel Lounsbury on May 15, 1987, when she signed the Consent form. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 3: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit Janet Lounsbury signed the Consent form prior 
to the time plaintiff Michel Lounsbury was taken to the operating room for 
performance of the operation at issue in this lawsuit. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 4: Denied. It was at the same time Plaintiff 
was taken to the operating room and was already under anesthesia. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit the Consent for relates to the operation 
performed on Michel Lounsbury on May 15, 1987, which is at issue in this 
lawsuit. 
ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 5: Admitted. 
DATED this ,j? day of CJ^tJ/l^^ 1989. / ^ ' / V ^ S 
^ t ? 
MICHEL S. L'OtfNSBtfRi* 7" 
sworn to before me this 3TX=< d&Y of //, , / y 
/ 
Notary PUDSC 
APPROVED FOR SUBMISSION: 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
T L O Y ^ H0L>I 
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C Z D A K C I T Y . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS to Elliot J. Williams, Esq. 
at SNOW, CHRISTEN SEN & MARTINEAU, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84145, by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on this /^£pday of 
W , « / » 1989-
Secretary / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to appellant, postage prepaid, this 
day of September, 1990. 
Elizabeth King 
